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Abstract
Recently, Fischer [1996] and Posen [1998] demonstrated empirically that coun-
tries with less independent central banks enjoy lower output losses during disin-

ationary cycles. Since independence is presume to provide a credibility bonus to
the monetary policy, this conclusion looks surprising. To explain their paradoxical
result, these authors put forward that independent central banks probably face a

atter short-run Phillips curve. In this paper, we provide a formal demonstration of
this point. More precisely, we demonstrate that the private sector has less incentive
to index its nominal wages when the central bank is granted with a large amount
of independence. Since an increased indexation steepens the short-run Phillips
curve, our result is consistent with the view that where central bank independence
is greater, the cost of disin
ation is higher. Our empirical tests, for a sample of 19
OECD countries, support our theoretical analysis. In particular, a negative and
signicant relationship is found between indexation and independence.
R esum e
Fischer [1996] et Posen [1998] ont r ecemment d emontr e empiriquement que les
pays dot es des banques centrales les moins ind ependantes payaient moins cher, en
terme r eels, leurs  episodes d esin
ationnistes. Dans la mesure o u l'ind ependance
des banques centrales est suppos ee fournir un suppl ement de cr edibilit e  a la poli-
tique mon etaire, cette conclusion est surprenante. An d'expliquer ce r esultat, ces
auteurs soulignent que les banques centrales les plus ind ependantes sont probable-
ment celles qui font face aux courbes de Phillips de court-terme les plus plates.
L'objectif de cet article est de fournir une d emonstration formelle de ce point.
Plus pr ecis ement, nous d emontrons que les salari es sont moins incit es  a indexer
leurs salaires nominaux lorsque la banque centrale est caract eris ee par une large
autonomie. Dans la mesure o u un accroissement de l'indexation salariale se traduit
par une courbe de Phillips de court-terme plus verticale, notre r esultat est compat-
ible avec le fait que les politiques mon etaires d esin
ationnistes sont plus co^ uteuses
dans les pays o u les banques centrales sont les plus ind ependantes. Nos tests em-
piriques, pour un  echantillon de 19 pays membres de l'OCDE, semblent corroborer
notre analyse th eorique. En particulier, une relation n egative et statistiquement
signicative est mise en  evidence entre l'indexation et le degr e d'ind ependance des
banques centrales.
Key words : central bank independence, indexation, sacrice ratio
JEL Classication : E52, E58
11 Introduction
A broad consensus have rallied around the idea that central bank independence eases
the attainment of price stability at little or no real economic cost. In Rogo [1985] the
establishment of an independent central bank is seen as a way to credibly commit the
state against the temptation of in
ationary surprise. Several empirical studies have
found a negative correlation between in
ation and central bank independence and no
systematic relationship between central bank independence and real economic perfor-
mances (Grilli Masciandaro and Tabellini [1991], Cukierman [1992] and Alesina and
Summers [1993] for example). The credibility bonus of central bank independence is
presumed to be the source of these results, even if it can be argued that these results are
insucient to establish a causal link. Recently, Fischer [1996] and Posen [1998] exam-
ined directly the credibility eect of central bank independence. However, as credibility
is not observable, these authors use a proxy developed by Ball [1994], the Sacrice Ra-
tio which is an indicator of the real costs of disin
ationary policy. Their results do not
support the view that central bank independence increases credibility. More precisely,
their main conclusion is that countries with independent central banks suer more
output losses over a disin
ationary cycle than countries with less independent central
banks.
The objective of this paper is to explain formally the negative relationship between
central bank independence and the sacrice ratio. Our framework is a game-theoretic
model of monetary policy developed by Rogo [1985] and extended to allow for indexed
nominal wage contracts. In this analysis, we demonstrate that the optimal degree of
wage indexation is negatively aected by the central bank independence. As increased
indexation steepens the short-run Phillips curve, our conclusion is that independent
central banks face a 
atter short-run Phillips curve and hence, their disin
ationary
policies are more costly since they are less credible. As stated by Posen [1998, p.338],
\There are, of course, other factors that determine the slope of the Phillips curve or
output-in
ation trade-o, but to whatever extend people are able to react to policy (for
example, are not bound by long-term contracts), the clearer signal that a more credible
policy conveys must translate into a smaller real eect of monetary policy".
Moreover, we demonstrate that central bank independence, by lowering the optimal
degree of nominal wage indexation, increases the output losses of disin
ationary policies
since it reduces the speed of disin
ation.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents the model of monetary policy
with indexed wage contracts. In section 3, we study the indexation behavior of the
private sector and we demonstrate that the optimal degree of indexation is decreasing
with central bank independence. Some empirical tests are presented in section 4. They
seem support our theoretical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model developed here, is built around the Barro-Gordon [1983] and Rogo [1985]
models extended to allow for indexed wage contracts as in Gray [1976] and Fischer
[1983]. It permits to study the strategic interactions between an optimizing monetary
authority and rational individuals. This model consists of a simple aggregate supply-
2aggregate demand model in which the supply side behavior is in
uenced by indexed
wage contracts and the demand side is driven by the quantity of money.
On the supply-side of the economy, labor is assumed the factor of production in the
short run and the output is given by the following production function:
yt = alt + ut ; 0 < a < 1 (1)
where yt and lt are the logs of the output and the employment levels respectively, ut is
a production shock which has a zero mean and a constant variance equal to 2
u. Prot
maximization by competitive rms leads to the following labor demand function:
ld
t = d + [1=(1   a)](pt   wt + ut) (2)
where d = ln(a)=(1   a) > 0, wt is the log of the nominal wage, pt is the log of price
level in time t. On the other hand, the labor supply is given as:
ls
t = d    + (pt   wt);  > 0 (3)
where the intercept term in (3) is not set equal to that of the demand for labor because
we assume that the labor supply is aected by distortions factor in the labor market,
captured by the parameter . These distortions are assumed to be the result of either
the income tax policies, or \insiders" behavior in the labor market which leads to an
excessive base real wage, as in Blanchard and Summers [1986].Then, by equating (2)
and (3) under the assumption that  = 01, we obtain the competitive equilibrium
nominal wage level in the labor market as follows:
b wt = pt + ut + (1   a) (4)
This wage is the market wage that would arise in the absence of nominal wage contracts
and leads, by using (2) and (1), to the following competitive equilibrium output level:
b yt = y   k + ut ; with y = ad; and k = a (5)
where the presence of the labor supply distortion factor, , is a key feature in this model
since it causes a reduction in the optimal labor supply of workers. This distortion of
output plays an important role in the policy decisions of the monetary authorities.
We assume that nominal wage contracts are signed at the beginning of each period.
Then shocks occurred and nally, according to the wage level and the realization of
the shocks, the monetary authorities set the money supply. Once wage contracts are
signed, employment becomes demand determined. Thus, a moral hazard problem arise.
This justies the incentive of workers to index their nominal wages to unexpected price
movements as in Gray [1976]. The indexing rule is given by:
1The inelastic labor supply assumption simplies our calculus without any loss of generality of our
results.
3wt = Et 1 b wt + (pt   Et 1pt); 1 >  > 0 (6)
where Et 1 is the rational expectation operator and  is the indexing parameter. For
 = 1, wages are fully indexed and for 0 <  < 1, wages are partially indexed.
Finally, the case where  = 0 (no indexation) corresponds to the Rogo's [1985] set up.
Integrating the equation (6) into (2) and using (1), we obtain the following aggregate
output supply function:
ys
t = y   k + c(1   )(pt   Et 1pt) + (1 + c)ut (7)
where c = a=(1   a).
Aggregate demand is assumed to be generated by a simple quantity theory equation:
yd
t = mt   pt + vt (8)
where mt is the logarithm of the nominal money supply and vt is a zero mean demand
shock with variance 2
v and is assumed to be uncorrelated with the supply shock. The








;  > 0 (9)
where y
t = b yt+k is the level of output desired by the government. Remember that the
parameter k re
ects the labor market distortions that the government seeks to oset
through the use of monetary policy. In addition, the government aims to minimize
deviations of the in
ation rate from its socially optimal level which we set equal to
zero for simplicity. The term  is the relative weight that the monetary authorities
place on the in
ation stabilization versus output stabilization. Following Rogo [1985],
we suppose an institutional arrangement in which monetary policy is delegated to an









where " > 0 is the optimal extra relative weight the central banker sets on in
ation
versus output stabilization2. The money stock is chosen by the central banker to
minimize his loss function (10), taking price expectations as given. Then, from the rst
order condition for a minimum of (10) and under the rational expectation hypothesis,
the equilibrium in








 + " + c2(1   )2ut (11)
2It can be demonstrated (see Rogo [1985] for a formal proof) that the optimal degree of central
bank conservativeness is strictly positive and nite : 0 < " < +1.
4yCB
t = b yt +
c( + ")
 + " + c2(1   )2ut (12)
where the subscript CB stands for the conservative central banker.
Equations (11) and (12) show that the monetary authority responds in such a way as
to completely oset the aggregate demand shock because this is consistent with the
stabilization of both output and price level. These two equations show the trade-o
between credibility and 
exibility. For a given value of the indexing parameter , an
increase in " induces a decrease in the in
ationary bias and a decrease of the central
bank stabilization response to output deviations. Finally, equations (11) and (12) also
show that for a given value of " (i.e. for a given precommitment technology), an
increased wage indexation reduces the in
ationary bias in the economy by making the
Phillips curve steeper (see Devereux [1987] and Fischer-Summers [1989]) and increases
the volatility of output since it reduces the monetary authority's stabilization power.
3 Indexation and central bank independence
The problem confronting the wage setters is to determine the degree of wage indexation
to price surprises taking into account the policy implemented by the central bank. We










As the union chooses optimally the degree of nominal wage indexation,  must be
solved endogenously in order to minimize the union's loss function. Thus, using (11)
and(12) into the union loss function (13), we can determine the level of the union's loss




( + ")2 k2 +
c2 
( + ")2 + c2(1   )2
[ + " + c2(1   )2]
2 2
u (14)
The union, like the government, faces the trade-o between in
ation and stabilization.
The rst term of (14) is the welfare loss resulting from the in
ationary bias and is
decreasing with indexation (since the Phillips curve becomes steeper). The second
term is the welfare loss resulting from the output and in
ation variability. It can be
easily demonstrated that this term is increasing with indexation. The union chooses
the nominal degree of wage indexation in order to realize the optimal trade-o between
in
ation and stabilization. We now endogenize the degree of nominal wage indexation.
Thus, solving for @LW
t =@ = 0 in equation (14), the following proposition can be
established:
Proposition 1 : When the optimal degree of indexation is not at a corner solution,
it will be lower the higher the degree of central bank independence. In other words, if
0 <  < 1, then:
 = (") with @=@" < 0
5Proof: see the appendix A.
Proposition 1 is the major new result of this paper. The intuition behind this propo-
sition is straightforward. As central bank independence reduces the mean in
ation
rate and its variance, it seems plausible that people would contract in longer nominal
term in order to economize on the costs of information or renegotiation for example.
A more analytical explanation can be provided if we note that indexation and central
bank independence have qualitatively the same impact on in
ation and output. They
both reduce the in
ationary bias and increase the output variability. If the government
increases the degree of central bank independence, the in
ationary bias will be lower
whereas the output variability will increase. The union will nd it optimal to reduce its
wage indexation in order to realize the optimal trade-o between in
ation and output
stabilization.
This result explains why increased indexation lowers the real cost of disin
ationary
policies since it steepens the short-run Phillips curve. But it can also be demonstrated3
that the speed of disin
ation is a positive function of the degree of nominal wage
indexation. This is another channel by which indexation lowers the sacrice ratio
since, as demonstrated by Ball [1994], \cold turkey" is less costly than \gradualism".
In the next section, we investigate empirically these results.
4 Empirical evidence
In this section, the theoretical insights oered by the model discussed before are em-
pirically investigated. The rst testable implication of the theory is that there may
be signicant interactions between the degree of nominal wage indexation and the cen-
tral bank independence (Proposition 1). From this perspective, the main empirical
implication of the model concerns the relation between the degree of the nominal wage
indexation, , and the degree of central bank conservativeness, ". In order to test these
theoretical results, we need quantitative measures of central bank independence and
nominal wage indexation. Since these theoretical concepts cannot be directly observed,
this investigation requires the use of some empirical proxies for the above variables.
In order to proxy ", we use four alternative indices of the legal degree of central
bank independence. The rst index used here is the legal index (CUK) developed by
Cukierman [1992]. The second index is the total index of political and economic inde-
pendence (GMT) developed by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini [1991].The third index
is the index (BP) developed by Bade and Parkin [1988]. The fourth index of central
bank independence (AS) is developed by Alesina and Summers [1993] and is a measure
based on Grilli et al. (1991) index of central bank independence and Bade and Parkin
[1988] index extended by Alesina [1988]. The rst index ranges between zero (least in-
dependent) and one (most independent), the second between one and fteen, the third
and the fourth between one and four. The nominal wage indexation is approximated
by two alternative proxies. The rst measure is the legal wage indexation (LWI) taken
from Bruno and Sachs [1985]. For a given country, these authors assign a value zero
(no indexation clauses), one (partial indexation) or two (widespread indexation). The
3See appendix B.
6Dependent variable:



















R2 0:25 0:18 0:41 0:60
Sample Size 18 14 15 15
S.E. of Reg. 0:767 0:861 0:707 0:581
Table 1: Legal Wage Indexation (LWI) and central bank independence (CBI)
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses. () = signicant at the 5(1)% level
second measure used in this paper is Bruno and Sachs's [1985] index of \nominal wage
responsiveness"(NWR). Higher values mean greater 
exibility (that is, shorter, more
indexed and more synchronized wage agreements). This index runs from zero to six.
Dependent variable:



















R2 0:17 0:33 0:41 0:42
Sample Size 16 13 14 14
S.E. of Reg. 1:623 1:634 1:463 1:450
Table 2: Nominal Wage Responsiveness (NWR) and central bank independence (CBI)
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses. () = signicant at the 5(1)% level
For our cross-country estimations, a sample of nineteen industrial OECD member
countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom, and the United States) is used in this paper. To test
Proposition 1 suggested by the theoretic model, our regression analysis (OLS method)
assumes the various indices of central bank independence to be the explanatory vari-
ables of nominal wage indexation.
Tables 1 and 2 report the main regression results of the two indices of nominal wage
indexation on the four alternative indices of central bank independence. The key result
7reported in these tables is consistent across all regressions and shows that the degree of
central bank independence has always a negative coecient. This negative coecient
is statistically signicant for six out of the eight regressions performed.
Dependent variable:












Sample Size 60 57
S.E. of Reg. 1:049 0:977
Table 3: Sacrice ratio and nominal wage indexation
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses. () = signicant at the 5(1)% level
Therefore, in these empirical results we nd evidence to support our rst theoretical
proposition according to which an increase in the degree of central bank independence
reduces the degree of wage indexation.
The second testable implication of our analysis is that nominal wage indexation
by making the short-run Phillips curve steeper reduces the sacrice ratio7. On the
contrary, central bank independence should increase the sacrice ratio. Tables 3 and 4
report respectively the results of our regressions concerning the relationships between
the sacrice ratio and our two indices of indexation and the relationships between the
sacrice ratio and the four indices of independence. These regressions were performed
using the sacrice ratio quarterly datas provided by Ball [1994].
Our results concerning the impact of central bank independence on the sacrice
ratio are qualitatively the same as those obtained by Fischer [1996] and Posen [1998].
They suggest that central bank independence does not provide a credibility bonus but
increases the cost of disin
ation. The eect of indexation on the sacrice ratio is
negative, even if only the nominal wage responsiveness (NWR) is signicant.
Finally, we test the eect of indexation and independence on the speed of disin-

ation. The speed of disin
ation is dened as the ratio between the total change in
in
ation during the disin
ationary cycle and the length in years of this disin
ationary
cycle.
From our theoretical analysis, indexation increases the speed of disin
ation and
hence, central bank independence reduces it. Tables 5 and 6 report our empirical
results. All the coecients have the expected sign. But these coecients are only
signicant for the central bank independence.
7See appendix B for a formal proof.
8Dependent variable:



















R2 0:07 0:09 0:10 0:07
Sample Size 64 48 52 52
S.E. of Reg. 1:003 1:076 1:045 1:063
Table 4: Sacrice ratio and central bank independence (CBI)















Sample Size 60 57
S.E. of Reg. 0:738 0:806
Table 5: Disin
ation speed and nominal wage indexation
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses. () = signicant at the 5(1)% level
5 Conclusion
Our objective in this paper was to explain why independent central banks face 
atter
short-run Phillips curve. We demonstrate that independence reduces the optimal de-
gree of nominal wage indexation since it reduces the variance of in
ation. However, a
reduced indexation means a 
atter short-run Phillips curve and a lower speed of disin-

ation. These two elements explain why the sacrice ratio is positively correlated with
central bank independence whereas it is negatively aected by the degree of nominal
wage indexation. The results of our empirical work seem to support our theoretical
analysis. There is a clear and negative relationship between the degree of central bank
independence and the degree of indexation.
9Dependent variable:
Speed of disin



















R2 0:07 0:16 0:10 0:06
Sample Size 64 48 52 52
S.E. of Reg. 0:748 0:716 0:732 0:750
Table 6: Disin
ation speed and central bank independence (CBI)
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses. () = signicant at the 5(1)% level
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
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This equation has one obvious root:  = 1. The second-order condition for a minimum
is satised for this solution i:
k2 > ( + 2")c22
u (A1)
When the condition (A1) is not fullled, we study the following equation:
f( ; ") =
( + ")2 
( + ")( + 2") + c2(1   )2





















We present here a modied version of the model used in the paper. This model is
described by the following equations:
y = b y + c(1   )(   e) (B1)
y = (m   p) (B2)
e =

m = m   m 1 (B3)




m   ) (B4)
Then, extracting  from (B1) and using (B3), the relation (B4) can be written as:

y =   h(y   b y)






(y   b y)dt =
Z 1
0
(y0   b y)e ht =
y0   b y
h
We assume that the monetary authority wants to ght in
ation with its monetary
policy and thus:











The sacrice ratio is negatively correlated with the degree of wage indexation. Since we
demonstrated that indexation is a decreasing function of central bank independence,
this result suggests that sacrice ratio is positively correlated with central bank in-
dependence. These results are supported by our empirical investigations presented in
section 4. Moreover, we can observe that the speed of convergence is positively aected
by indexation and hence negatively aected by central bank independence. Our empir-
ical tests seem to support the negative relationship between central bank independence
and the speed of disin
ation. However, the positive eect of indexation on the speed
of disin
ation does not appear to be statistically signicant.
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